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The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking 
industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we 
distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank 
of  Russia,  by  sub-federal  (regional  and  municipal)  authorities,  by  state-owned  enterprises  and 
banks, and by „state corporations‟. We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% 
of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing 
group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-
controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and ero-
sion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the 
largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking sys-
tem. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in 
CEE countries.  
 
Key  words:  Russian  banks;  transition;  banking;  state;  government;  public  sector;  state-owned 
banks; state-controlled banks; state-influenced banks  
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Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan julkisen sektorin osuutta Venäjän pankkisektorista. Työssä identi-
fioidaan ja luokitellaan ainakin 78 pankkia, joiden toimintaan julkinen sektori pystyy vaikuttamaan. 
Tutkimuksessa myös erotellaan pankit, joissa enemmistön omistus on liittovaltiolla tai keskuspank-
illa, alue-  tai kuntaviranomaisilla, valtion  omistamilla  yrityksillä tai pankeilla sekä valtiokorpo-
raatioilla. Arvion mukaan näiden pankkien markkinaosuus suureni 56 prosenttiin koko pankkisek-
torin varoista kesäkuun 2009 lopussa. Kaikkein nopeimmin ovat kasvaneet pankit, joissa julkisen 
sektorin kontrolli on epäsuoraa. Keskittyminen on lisääntynyt julkisen sektorin omistamissa pan-
keissa, ja viiden suurimman tällaisen pankin osuus koko pankkisektorista on jo 40 %. Yksityisen 
pääoman  osuus  pankkisektorilla  on  vähentynyt.  Suuret  valtion  hallitsemat  pankit  de  facto 
muodostavat pankkisektorin ytimen. Muutokset pankkien omistuksessa ovat olleet hyvin erilaisia 
muihin siirtymätalouksiin verrattuna. 
 
Asiasanat: venäläiset pankit, transitio, pankkitoiminta, julkinen valta, julkinen sektori, julkisen sek-
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1  Introduction  
 
The primary motivation for this paper is to contribute to the study of the phenomenon of state-
influenced banking in the Russian context. While the pervasiveness of the public sector in Russia is 
widely recognized, it is not a simple task to document it carefully. We collect empirical data to 
check whether the ownership structure of the banking industry has indeed shifted in favor of state-
controlled players, which explains our interest in a more refined classification of state-influenced 
and state-controlled banks and in the techniques of state control over nominally private institutions. 
These issues are relevant for studies of comparative efficiency and performance of institutions of 
different ownership types. Karas et al. [2008] found – surprisingly – that in Russia domestic private 
banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. Their study relies on public bank lists con-
tained in two different Russian sources, dated 2002 and 2005. Since then, numerous private banks 
have changed hands. Moreover, we identify fairly many state-influenced banks for which the gov-
ernment is not a shareholder of record. For comparative purposes, the accuracy of data sample is 
critical, so we try to update the sample for future research. 
Our second motivation was to follow up on a question posed in a BOFIT discussion paper 
in the early 2007: In what direction is the Russian banking industry moving? [Vernikov, 2007]. By 
the middle of the 2000 decade, we found parity between public sector and private sector and a 
suboptimal institutional equilibrium. Just three years later the situation appears substantially differ-
ent, as the public sector has taken over. The direction of ownership change in Russia has clearly di-
verged from the path that all European transition countries (except Belarus) have followed. Banking 
industry structure is becoming similar to those in China and Vietnam. The domestic private sector is 
being eroded. It remains unclear to what extent such phenomena as quantitative lending targets, 
price controls over bank loans and deposits, administrative interference, and weakening of the rule 
of law reflect the global financial crisis or are due to public sector expansion.  
A  few  papers  on  state-influenced  banks  in  Russia  have  emerged  since  2007.  Babayev 
[2007] discusses key definitions related to state banking and offers a classification of public banks. 
Glushkova and Vernikov [2009] and Glushkova [2009] suggest a more elaborate classification dis-
tinguishing between control  via state ownership, via the  governance mechanism, and via other 
mechanisms. They also make an assessment of public sector size in terms of combined market share Andrei Vernikov 
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of public banks by the beginning of 2009. Vernikov [2009a; 2009b] offers yet another version of 
public bank classifications and updates market shares with July 1, 2009 data. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives key definitions and conven-
tions and presents the author‟s classifications of state-influenced banks. Section 3 assesses the share 
of the public sector in Russian banking. Section 4 describes the changes in the ownership structure 
of the banking industry. Section 5 places the evolution of Russian banking in an international con-
text. Section 6 summarizes our findings and offers some suggestions for future research.  
     
 
2  Government banking: Scope, definitions and classifications 
 
There is no universally recognized methodology for classifying bank shares and participations as 
public or private, especially with regard to downstream holdings. Absence of the state (understood 
as federal-level authorities) among bank shareholders of record provides a formal basis for treating 
such a bank as private property. The legal status of bank equity belonging to state-owned enter-
prises (hereinafter SOEs) and state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) remains partially unregu-
lated. The law does not clearly distinguish between property on the federal level versus the sub-
sovereign level. For the above reasons, we could not fully rely on official publications; their scope 
and coverage of state-influenced banks does not suit our purpose of substantive analysis of the pub-
lic sector that penetrates the surface of legal formalities. Attribution of a bank to one or another 
category was therefore judgmental, albeit based on all available information and signals. Here we 
unfortunately see no alternative. 
The main criterion of classifying a bank as state-influenced is the degree of control over its 
decision-making and lending policy by state authorities and managers in charge of public capital. 
Control can be exercised via equity ownership, via governance, or otherwise. As far as „grandson‟ 
entities are concerned
3, their classifications depend on whether entities substantially influenced by 
the state can exert substantial influence on decisions made by owners and top-managers whose 
combined share of the given bank‟s equity exceeds 50%. In order to identify state-influenced banks, 
we searched for state authorities and all kinds of public sector institutions among listed shareholders 
at individual banks. First we found Russia‟s 200 largest institutions in terms of asset total. Then the 
sample was supplemented with smaller banks found to be affiliated with the government. Informa-
                                                 
3 We call „grandson‟ entities those banks for which over 50% of the equity belongs to companies and banks that are 
fully public property or with mixed public/private capital.  
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tion sources included statutory disclosure by banks and their parent companies, annual and quarterly 
reports, CBR publications and websites, RBC rankings, and other publicly available sources. 
We tried to organize the diverse forms of interaction between banks and the authorities into 
a classification scheme (see Fig.1).  
State-owned banks, or government-owned banks, or public banks, represent the center-
piece of the suggested classification (Group 1.1). These are banks directly or indirectly majority-
owned
4 by the state and/or public funds. Banks in subgroup 1.1.1 are directly state-owned in the 
sense that that their major or sole shareholder is an executive body at the federal, regional or mu-
nicipal level, or a CBR. Banks in subgroup 1.1.2 are indirectly state-owned, because they are mostly 
capitalized by funds of public origin but do not belong directly to state authorities. Public funds can 
be  invested  in  bank  equity  by  state-owned  companies
5  and  SOCBs,  by  the  Deposit  Insurance 
Agency (ASV, in Russian), Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vneshekonom-
bank), or by any other institution established with public funds.  
 
Figure 1  Classification of state-influenced banks 
 
* At least 50% of equity originates from public funds 
 
Our next category is state-governed banks (subgroup 1.2). Here we include banks whose key deci-
sions the state can influence via corporate governance mechanisms, even without a controlling gov-
ernment equity stake. Influence may come, e.g., from ASV acting as bank liquidator or rehabilita-
                                                 
4 Majority ownership implies that at least 50% of equity has its primary origin in public funds. In the literature one 
comes across more liberal criteria: La Porta et al. would recognize a bank as „government-owned‟ if government holds 
at least 20% of equity but acts as the single largest shareholder [La Porta et al., 2002]. 
5 State-owned companies Gazprom, Rosneft, Russian Railways, and Alrosa have equity participation in banks. Andrei Vernikov 
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tor; from a government official actively participating in a bank‟s board of directors, etc. A local 
government would in some cases agree to a dilution of its controlling stake in a bank via new pri-
vate owners in exchange for keeping a majority of seats on the board of directors. 
State-owned  banks  plus  state-governed  banks  make  up  our  next  category  of  state-
controlled banks or government-controlled banks
6. We believe that this sample corresponds to what 
is often called the public sector in the banking industry.  
Finally, our broadest category is state-influenced banks or government-influenced banks
7. 
Apart from state-controlled banks, this category includes other state-influenced banks. State influ-
ence can be identified in a variety of situations including, but not limited to, the following:  
  A bank receives a large share of interest income from government bodies
8; 
  Government or a SOE appears among the bank‟s minority shareholders; 
  ASV coordinates the process of bank rehabilitation after yielding shareholder control and op-
erational powers to a new strategic investor; 
  Delegates from a government body or a public sector entity sit on the bank‟s board of direc-
tors and can influence strategic decisions, but such influence is far from decisive and does 
not enable them to take key decisions single-handedly; 
  So-called „oporniye banki‟ (base, supporting, pivotal banks) of ministries, public sector enti-
ties, regional or local authorities. Nominally these banks are privately-owned and run; 
  A CBR delegate is present in the bank to oversee the use of financial assistance provided by 
CBR and other public authorities. 
 
Our classification displayed in Fig. 1 is quite similar to that of Babayev [2007], except for some de-
tails. Firstly, in our investigation of state control and influence over commercial banks we did not 
limit the scope of analysis to equity stake ownership. We obtained sufficient empirical evidence of a 
strong government role in banks whose controlling equity stake remains nominally in private hands 
(group 1.2). We assume that when looking at a society with blurred and poorly defined ownership 
rights, one should avoid a purely legalistic approach, which is likely to artificially limit the scope of 
analysis. A qualitative approach can be used instead to identify various non-evident forms of state 
presence and assess its true magnitude.  
                                                 
6 CBR experts have started using the term „state-controlled banks‟ in their analytical reports without specifying which 
exactly banks are meant [CBR, 2009, pp.18, 20, 24]. As far as we can judge by the nature of statistical indicators pro-
vided, CBR experts stick to a rather narrow definition of „state‟ and basically cover only banks that belong to federal 
and regional executive authorities. We choose to define this category as „state-owned banks‟ and place them in sub-
group 1.1.1 in Fig. 1, while our interpretation of „state-controlled banks‟ is broader. 
7 Russian-speakers would probably use the expression „banki s gosudarstvennym uchastiem’, or literally „banks with 
state participation‟, to describe the same phenomenon. 
8 Even a bank receiving a large share of interest income from government bodies can be defined as a public bank [Karas 
et al., 2008].  
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Secondly, Babayev covers banks for which for over 50% of the equity is held by „state cor-
porations‟ and flagship banks of state-controlled groups [Babayev, 2007, p.60]. We broaden the 
scope  by  including  in  the  sample  other  indirectly  state-owned  banks,  i.e.  „grandson‟,  „grand-
grandson‟, etc. downstream structures controlled by „state corporations‟ and SOEs. We presume 
that the state can ultimately enforce its will on such nominally private banks via a chain of interme-
diate owners. 
Thirdly, Babayev [2007, p.60] qualifies as „state-owned‟ only fully (100%) state-owned 
banks, regardless of whether ownership is exercised directly or indirectly. We find this to be  too 
restrictive. Rosselkhozbank would meet the criterion of 100% state ownership, but neither Sberbank 
nor VTB would, due to their minority holdings of equity. The broad public and the professional 
community always refer to both of these institutions as gosudarstvennie banki, or gosbanki (state-
owned banks). The law does not specifically deal with SOCBs. We prefer to use the term „SOB‟ in 
a broader meaning that includes all state-owned banks (subgroup 1.1). 
     
   
Table 1  State-controlled banks in Russia 
 
Number of banks 
 
01.01.2001  01.07.2009 
Banks predominantly owned by public capital,  33  50 
out of which, majority owned by   
       Federal executive authorities and the CBR  6  4 
     Regional and municipal authorities  11  13 
     State-owned companies, state-owned banks and „state corporations‟  16  33 
Banks governed by the state without a majority stake in equity  9  11 
State-controlled banks, total  42  61 
Other state-influenced banks  …  17 
Total, state-influenced banks  …  78 
 
Source: Author’s estimate based on CBR and ASV data and formal disclosure of respective commercial banks. 
 
Our broad sample of state-influenced banks includes 77 institutions, of which 60 are state-
controlled banks and 17 are other state-influenced banks (Table 1). We report that by mid-2009, 6 
commercial banks were owned by federal level authorities, 13 by regional and municipal authori-
ties, and 31 by SOEs and SOCBs; another 11 institutions were governed by the state without major 
equity participation. The full sample is displayed in Appendix Table A2. 
 Andrei Vernikov 
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3  The size of  public sector 
 
We define market share as the percentage of total banking assets
9 held by state-controlled banks. 
Market shares of other state-influenced banks are disregarded for the sake of keeping our estimates 
conservative. When state participation exceeded 50%, the bank‟s assets were counted fully. Banks 
with minority state participation and not governed by the state were not included.  
One can calculate “controlled assets” as a sum of multiples of each bank‟s assets by the 
equity share:  
 
G = ∑ Аi x Si , 
 
where G is total assets controlled by the government, Аi is a bank‟s asset total,  and Si is share of 
equity belonging to the state. In the Russian situation, this method may be inappropriate because we 
think that it would distort substance. In an economy with legal institutions and governance tradi-
tions like Russia‟s only a controlling stake enables the owner to defend his interests. A blockholder 
can project his control over the entire assets of a bank. For instance, CBR owns no more than 57.6% 
of Sberbank ordinary shares and yet government representatives enjoy full control over Sberbank 
and its lending policies. There is no such thing as control of assets proportional to equity stake. Un-
related minority shareholders essentially control 0% of a company
10.. 
Combined market share of predominantly state-owned banks in Russia grew from 35.9% 
in January 2001 to 56% of total assets in July 2009, or by 1.6 times (Table 2). Adding state-
governed banks without majority state ownership raises the combined market share of the public 
sector to 57.1% of all banking assets.   
                                                 
9 In our opinion, the asset-total indicator is a superior proxy for the magnitude of a bank‟s activity than the amount of 
charter capital or shareholders‟ equity. Better yet would be to calculate market share as share of loans and credits out-
standing, total and per each type of lending (corporate loans, loans to households, mortgage loans, etc.). But data defi-
ciencies did not presently enable this, and it remains on the research agenda for the future. 
10 While unpractical for calculating total banking assets influenced by the state, the method of proportional accounting 
can nevertheless be successfully employed to assess all state equity participations in commercial banks, including mi-
nority stakes and indirectly owned stakes. That is quite essential for analysing efficiency of direct state involvement in 
the banking sector, or the return from privatization.   
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Table 2   Market share of state-controlled banks, % of total banking assets* at start of  period 
 
2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  07.2009 
Banks predominantly 
owned by public capital**  35.9  37.2  39.0  39.4  40.7  43.5  44.3  45.3  53.5  56.0 
Banks governed by the 
state, without majority 
equity stake 
0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.6  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.1 
Total  36.3  37.6  39.4  39.8  41.2  44.7  45.5  46.5  54.6  57.1 
 
* including corporate lending by VEB; ** including VEB 
Source: author’s calculations based on CBR data [CBR, 2009], VEB, and RBC. 
 
 
Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vneshekonombank, or VEB) is a financial 
institution that has the word „bank‟ in its official name but formally is not a bank but rather a „state 
corporation‟ governed by a special individual law. It is not chartered nor licensed as a bank; CBR 
has no regulatory power over VEB, and it is not covered in the national banking statistics. Foreign 
parties, however, do consider VEB to be a bank for all practical purposes, and do not hesitate to in-
clude VEB‟s external assets and liabilities in statistical aggregates of the Russian banking sector. 
Apart from several specific functions where VEB acts as governmental agent, VEB also performs 
operations that in essence do not differ from the activity of regular commercial banks. VEB lends to 
Russian non-financial companies, and the bank‟s IFRS reporting discloses in sufficient detail the 
size of its commercial-loan portfolio comprising corporate loans, pre-export financing, and project 
finance. We assume that in this area of its activity VEB is a lending institution that appeals to the 
same class of borrowers, making it a de facto competitor of other large corporate banks
11. We esti-
mate the commercial loan portfolio of VEB to have reached RUB577bn by mid-2009, or 2% of to-
tal assets of the official banking system. This amount is sufficient to dismiss the formal objection 
that VEB is not a bank. We do add VEB‟s commercial loan figures to the Russian banks‟ totals 
when assessing the overall amount of bank assets under the influence of the state. We believe that 
this results in a fuller coverage.  
Our calculations and estimates might entail upward or downward bias. Potential  upward 
bias stems from the fact that control does not automatically follow from equity ownership. There is 
ample empirical evidence of the state not fully exercising its rights as shareholder of banks, and of 
                                                 
11 “We include development banks because their function is precisely to provide long term finance to devel-
opment projects where private finance may fail (Myrdal 1968), and hence they constitute a prominent form 
of government entry into bank lending” [La Porta et al., 2002]. Andrei Vernikov 
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state-owned banks not acting in the public interest. If pursuit of government policy or defense of 
public interest were strict criteria, then the public sector would be deemed to comprise only a hand-
ful of institutions. Recognizing that our use of the term „control‟ may be too broad in some cases, 
we still draw the limits of public sector where the state could theoretically reach, whether it actually 
does or not. The potential upward bias may be caused by a misinterpretation of relations between 
state and banking business. Feature such as membership of a high-ranking government official in 
the bank‟s board of directors can reflect two different phenomena, either business capture by the 
state or state capture by private business. Attribution is unavoidably judgmental in cases when there 
is no equity participation of the state but only control via corporate governance. The margin of error 
equals the market share of this category of banks, i.e. 1.1 percentage points. However we feel con-
fident about most of the entries, so that upward bias is highly unlikely to inflate the bottom line in 
Table 2 by more than 0.3 percentage points.   
Although  our  sample  is  representative  enough
12,  we  may  have  missed  state-influenced 
banks as a result of poor disclosure of ownership structures and related parties, but those would be 
fairly small banks. The first 100 banks were screened carefully, and in Russia an institution below 
the top-100 cannot have a market share exceeding 0.07% and below the top-200 only 0.03%. The 
cumulative error should not exceed 2 percentage points of market share. 
The outcome of our calculation appears to be on the high side if compared to most other 
sources using the same or similar indicator (Table 3). Central Bank of Russia experts put the share 
of total assets held by state-controlled banks at just 40.6%
13 [CBR, 2009a]. The Raiffeisenbank re-
search department suggests that the market share of state-controlled banks is 45.7% of total assets 






                                                 
12 Identification of state-influenced banks is a continuous process. After the release of the previous version of this work-
ing paper in October 2009 [Vernikov, 2009a], we identified 5 subsidiary banks of TransKreditBank; a bank owned by 
Alrosa, the state-controlled diamond mining company; a bank owned by Odintsovo municipality in the Moscow region 
and a bank governed by the administration of the Leningrad region. All these banks were added to the sample. 
13 Central Bank of Russia has published more detailed information on market shares of „state-controlled banks‟ in spe-
cific segments such as corporate loans, loans to households, corporate deposits, household deposits, securities portfo-
lios, and total profit/loss of the banking sector (see Table A1 in Appendix).  
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Table 3   Market share of public banks in Russia, January 1, 2009 
Author / source  Indicator 
Market share, % 
of total assets 
CBR, 2009  „state-controlled banks‟  40.6 
Raiffeisenbank, 2009  „state-owned banks‟  45.7 
Glushkova, Vernikov, 2009  „state-owned banks‟  56.0 
Glushkova, Vernikov, 2009  „state-controlled banks‟  59.0 
author’s calculation  „state-owned banks‟  53.4 
author’s calculation  „state-controlled banks‟  54.6 
 
The gap of 12.8 percentage points between the CBR figure and our estimate is material enough to 
require some comment. The most likely explanation is the difference in the scope of coverage and 
definitions. The CBR definition of a state-controlled bank is narrow; it excludes numerous banking 
offspring of public companies. Moreover, our most recent estimate suggests a slightly lower num-
ber than in [Glushkova, Vernikov, 2009] as a result of reclassification of several private banks 
where we fail identify a critical impact of state authorities on strategic decisions. Those banks were 
moved from the „state-governed‟ to „other state-influenced‟ category and were dropped form the 
core sample.     
 
 
4  Changes in industry structure  
 
State withdrawal from the commercial banking sector in the 1990s was inconsistent. Core banks 
never became subject to genuine privatization. Instead, there was tacit appropriation of substantial 
banking assets in the public sector by bank insiders. Combined with very rapid growth of green-
field private banks, that drove the market share of public sector to a low of 30% or so in 1998. After 
the 1998 crisis, however, the trend was definitely reversed. Public sector assets grew organically 
due to the greater dynamism of state-owned banks, and via takeovers of failed private banks, espe-
cially  after September  2008
14.  The  recent  financial  crisis  of  2008-9  only catalyzed the  process 
(Fig.2). 
                                                 
14 First takeovers were unrelated to the 2008 crisis: Vneshtorgbank (now VTB) used public funds to take over the failed 
Guta-Bank in 2004 and the viable Promstroybank in 2005. Andrei Vernikov 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on CBR data 
 
 





Sources: Author’s calculations and estimates based on CBR data 
 
In 2006 we noted a parity between market strength of domestic private banks and public 
institutions and predicted that the standoff would not be sustainable [Vernikov, 2007]. It was not.  
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By 2009 the public sector has convincingly overtaken both the domestic private sector and foreign-
controlled banks in terms of share of total assets. A breakdown of the Russian banking sector by 
form of ownership is displayed in Fig.3. 
The estimate of combined market share of private actors (slightly below 45%) might be too 
optimistic.  In  Fig.3  state-governed  banks  are  treated  as  nominally  private,  for  formal  reasons. 
Moreover, we simplistically tend to assume that all foreign-controlled banks in Russia are private
15. 
In any case, domestic private capital stopped being the leading force in the industry. Its gradual ero-
sion and crowding-out from the core of banking into regional and product niches continues. Natural 
attrition by bankruptcy  and voluntary exit is  complemented by business capture resulting from 
growing dependence of private banks on CBR and other authorities for funding and capital. 
Restructuring takes place within the public sector. The number of banks majority-owned 
by state authorities at federal, regional or municipal levels has remained unchanged (17) in the 2000 
decade. Meanwhile, the number of institutions controlled by SOEs and SOCBs has doubled from 16 
to 33, and their share of all state-controlled banks‟ assets more than doubled from 10.7% to 23.7% 
(Fig.4).  
Figure 4  Restructuring among state-controlled banks (% of total assets) 
 
* Including commercial loan portfolio held by Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs – Vneshekonombank 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from CBR, RBC and VEB. 
 
                                                 
15 A few foreign subsidiaries are actually owned by public institutions, and apart from banks representing Azerbaijan, 
China, India, Iran or Uzbekistan there are as well banks from Germany (West LB) and UK (Royal Bank of Scotland). Andrei Vernikov 
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Direct public ownership of banks is thus giving way to indirect ownership and control. Ex-
ecutive authorities delegate owner rights to related companies. We find growing evidence of multi-
level holding structures with a large state-owned company or SOCB at the top of the pyramid. Each 
superior entity holds a controlling stake at the lower-level entity. An example of this type of control 
is shown in Fig.5. The Russian state controls Gazprom, which via one of its divisions (Mezhregion-
gaz)  owns  Gazenergoprombank,  which  took  over  Sobinbank,  which  in  turn  is  used  to  control 
Russky ipotechny bank. Likewise, Gazprom  controls Gazprombank, which uses an intermediate 
nominal owner (OOO “Novie finansovie technologii”) to own 68.8% of Severgazbank. We find 
three or four intermediate ownership levels between officially public funds in Gazprom and the eq-
uity stake in a downstream commercial bank. There are similar cases in addition to the Gazprom 
group. The state-run monopoly Russian Railways JSC owns TransKreditBank, which in turn owns 
five subsidiary banks. 
 
Figure 5     Example of control structure in Gazprom group 
 
Source: Bank data. 
The use of multi-level holding structures often signals entrenchment of the blockholder 
against outside shareholders
16. In our case, the blockholder is not necessarily the government; it 
might also be the top management of SOEs. Public property invested in a subsidiary company or 
bank stops being public and becomes quasi-private. Public control and scrutiny over the use of pub-
lic funds gets weaker with each additional tier. The bank at the end of the chain should still be re-
garded as public property in view of the predominantly public origin of funds at the top-level com-
pany. For all practical purposes, however, influential insiders (bank top managers, board members 
and the public officials who represent the authorities) treat such property and dispose of it as if it 
were their own private property. Use of the diluted public property by insiders is often followed by 
appropriation.  
                                                 
16 On entrenchment of the blockholder against outside shareholders see: [Morck, Steier, 2005]. Entrenchment is a way 
to leave without leaving, i.e. to maintain leverage over the company after formally divesting from it.  
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Concentration is increasing within the public sector. In 2001-9, the market share of the five 
largest state-related banking groups (Sberbank, VTB group, Gazprombank group, Rosselkhozbank, 
and Bank Moskvy) jumped from 34.5% to 49% of Russia‟s total bank assets (Fig.6). Another im-
portant banking group is being shaped under Vneshekononbank, which has four banking subsidiar-
ies in Russia, one in Ukraine and one in Belarus. Of the ten largest banks by total assets, six are 
now public entities and only one is domestic private.  
 
Figure 6  Share of leading state-controlled banking groups (% of total bank assets) 
 
* VTB Bank, Bank VTB24 and Bank VTB-Severo-Zapad; **Gazprombank, Bank GPB-Ipoteka, Kredit-Ural, Severgazbank, Sibirgaz-
bank and Noyabrskneftekombank. 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from CBR and RBC 
 
The phenomenon of domestic champions from the public sector fits the pattern of disman-
tlement of a monobank and establishment of large SOBs each specialized in its own field such as 
foreign trade, agriculture, construction, etc. A similar system emerged in USSR in 1988 when „spe-
cialist  banks‟  („spetsbanki‟)  Sberbank,  Vneshtorgbank,  Promstroybank,  Zhilsotsbank  and  Agro-
prombank were spun-off from the state bank Gosbank. We observe a return to a modernized version 
of essentially the same system of „spetsbanki‟ based on a few core banks with a focus on a particu-
lar sphere of the economy or region - e.g., Rosselkhozbank (agriculture), Gazprombank (gas indus-
try),  Bank Moskvy (city of Moscow), Sberbank and VTB24 (retail), VTB (large corporate business 
and export financing) or TransKreditBank (railways). 
Public banks now constitute a third tier of the Russian banking system, not explicitly ob-
served in national law. What makes them a separate tier is not only access to privileges or being Andrei Vernikov 
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„too big to fail‟, but performance of special functions. In addition to the functions generally per-
formed by all commercial banks, we see public banks also acting as: 
  providers of liquidity to banks in the lower tier, the liquidity mostly originating from public 
funds; 
  vehicles designed to acquire and hold non-core industrial assets deemed as strategic by state au-
thorities. These assets range from construction companies in Russia to a carmaker in Germany; 
  long-term investment providers to „systemically-important‟ enterprises and „strategic projects‟, 
including those with a social or political dimension like sport or congress facilities; 
  corporate  raiders  and  vehicles  of  property  redistribution,  especially  with  regard  to  assets 
pledged to banks by owners against loans received; 
  first-aid provider of funds to socially or politically sensitive ventures. 
 
 
5  International context 
 
We earlier suggested that reassertion of government presence in the Russian banking industry dif-
fers markedly from the general pattern in transition countries [Vernikov, 2007]. European transition 
countries have moved away from government banking
17 towards an internationally-open model of 
banking dominated by private capital, foreign or national (Fig.7). In Russia and Belarus the share of 
public banks exceeds 50%, and is on the rise. These two countries now appear to be pursuing simi-
lar strategies, albeit Belarus has done it more consistently throughout the past years. 
 
Figure 7  Market shares of state-controlled banks (% of total assets) 
 
Sources: Author’s calculations for Russia; [Raiffeisen, 2006; 2009] for other transition economies. 
                                                 
17 Serbia and Slovenia were among the last to join the general trend of having the market share of public banks under 
20%.  
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Industrial policy with regard to banking aims at modernization and increase of efficiency, 
under strict government control and guidance. The difference between Russia and Central and East-
ern European economies is not in the pace of transition, as reform-thinkers often claim, but in the 
direction. Russian banking is evolving towards a quite different system that may well be the system 
existing in China and Vietnam. China, Russia and Vietnam all try to grow „national champions‟ 
within the public sector. The number of such core banks varies from four in China and Vietnam to 
five in Russia
18 with combined market shares of 49% in Russia, 65% in China and 70% in Vietnam. 
True privatization of leading financial institutions has been carefully avoided and remains off the 
agenda, although private minority shareholding was made possible.  
 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
 
Our  empirical  study  helped  to  identify  at  least  78  state-influenced  banks,  including  61  state-
controlled banks. By the end of the 2000 decade, state-controlled banks commanded 54.6% of total 
assets, thus constituting the core of the Russian banking industry. Concentration is growing within 
the public sector, and the main players controlled by the state (Sberbank, VTB group, Rosselkhoz-
bank and Bank Moskvy) hold 81.7% of the group‟s assets. 
The main direction of ownership change in the industry can be described as renationaliza-
tion, sometimes creeping and sometimes rampant. In terms of industry structure Russia might emu-
late the banking model of China or Vietnam, rather than Czech Republic or Poland. Major public 
banks became an intermediate tier of the system between the CBR and the rest of commercial 
banks. The domestic private sector is being diluted, eroded and crowded out. After 20 years of ex-
perimenting  with  private financial intermediation,  Russia appears  to  be  backtracking towards a 
state-run credit system. 
We detected two new trends: (a) delegation of owner‟s rights vis-à-vis banks from gov-
ernment authorities to state-owned companies and banks and „state corporations‟; and (b) multi-
                                                 
18 Big-5 in Russia (Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Rosselkhozbank and Bank Moskvy); Big-4 in China (Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction Bank); and Big-4 in 
Vietnam (Bank for Investment and Development, Industrial Commercial Bank, Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural  Development,  and  Bank  of  Foreign  Trade).  One  might  find  some  similarity  in  the  above-mentioned  banks‟ 
names.  Andrei Vernikov 
 
Russian banking: 
The state makes a comeback? 
 
  20 
level structures of corporate ownership over banks, as part of the „entrenchment‟ of the state and/or 
other insiders against external shareholders. 
The number of state-owned banks has reached the level of 50. This calls for a „rationaliza-
tion‟ of the holdings. If our hypothesis about return to the system of „spetsbanki‟ (state-owned spe-
cialist banks) is correct, one will soon be seeing mergers between public banks and even disposals 
of redundant entities. The federal budget is in deficit and needs non-oil revenues, hence divestment 
from banks is an option. Insiders are eager to „privatize‟ (read: appropriate at submarket prices) the 
resources that authorities have pumped into their banks in 2008-9 before bank-share prices resume 
growth. 
The baseline scenario for the immediate future rests on current trends of strengthening of 
market positions held by state-controlled banks. Public funds remain the main, if not the only, 
source of investment and liquidity, and public banks will keep their grip on the flow of these funds. 
Upside ‘risk’ depends on a more favorable external environment (oil price). It would give breathing 
space to private banks and postpone the need for severe forms of resource mobilization. Downside 
risk is linked to adverse market environment as well as some form of social, political or ethnic un-
rest that will briskly increase centralization of all resources and enhance redistributive elements in 
the economy and society.  
We see several directions for future research: 
  further testing of the hypothesis that public banks are more efficient that private ones [Karas et 
al., 2008], based on an upgraded definition of public banks and a broader sample; 
  comparing growth patterns of banks representing different forms of ownership; 
  impacts of state-controlled banks on competition in specific segments of the market for banking 
services (lending to medium-sized businesses; lending to small business and micro financing; 
mortgage lending; consumer loans; household deposits; etc.); 
  patterns of opportunistic behavior of public bank insiders and the channel of rent extraction; 
  causality between expansion of public property in the banking industry and revival of insti-
tutions inherent to redistributive economies, e.g. price controls and administrative resource 
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Table A1  Market share of state-controlled banks, % (CBR data) 
Share of:  01.01.2008  01.01.2009 
Total assets  39.2  40.6 
Loans to non-financial companies and households  44.0  45.8 
Loans to households  41.0  41.3 
Corporate deposits  32.4  32.8 
Household deposits  57.0  59.0 
Fixed-income securities portfolios held by banks  40.8  37.6 
Equity securities portfolios held by banks  45.7  19.1 
Financial result of the banking sector  40.3  48.4 
Source: [CBR, 2009; 2008].  
 
Table A2  Russia: list of state-influenced banks19, July 1, 2009 
reg.#  bank name  city  note 
   
Banks owned by federal executive authorities and CBR 
3349  Rosselkhozbank  Moscow  Federal Government 
3099  Rossiyskaya finansovaya 
korporaciya 
Moscow  Federal Government 
1481  Sberbank  Moscow  CBR 
1000  VTB  St.Petersburg  Federal Government 
 
  Banks owned by regional and municipal authorities 
2602  Almazergienbank  Yakutsk  Yakutia regional administration - 54% 
708  Bank Kazani  Kazan  Kazan municipality - 100% 
2748  Bank Moskvy  Moscow  Moscow municipality 
1280  Chuvashkreditprombank  Cheboksary  Chuvashia regional administration -60% (?) 
1399  Elita  Kaluga  Kaluga regional administration 
1971  Khanty-Mansiyskiy  Khanty-Mansiysk  Khanty-Mansiysk regional administration 
3360  Krayinvestbank  Krasnodar  Krasnodar regional administration - 97% 
3344  Moskovskoe ipotechnoe 
agentstvo 
Moscow  Moscow municipality - 100% 
3197  Odinbank  Odintsovo, Moscow region  Odintsovo municipality – 56.7% 
3269  Orenburg  Orenburg  Orenburg regional administration - 99% 
2015  Sibsotsbank  Barnaul  Altay regional administration - 99.9% 
2802  Yoshkar-Ola  Yoshkar-Ola  Mariy El regional administration - 71% 
918  Zapsibkombank  Tyumen  Tyumen region - 25.1%, Yamalo-Nenets region 
-25.1% 
 
  Banks majority-owned by state-owned companies, state-owned banks and ‘state corporations’ 
1339  Chitapromstroybank  Chita   TransKreditBank - 75% 
843  Dalnevostochniy  Vladivostok  Vserossiysky bank razvitiya regionov 
3284  Gazenergoprombank  Gazoprovod, Moscow region  Gazprom via Mezhregiongaz 
354  Gazprombank  Moscow  Gazprom, directly and via Gazfond 
                                                 
19 Classification of banks into one or another category is done for analytical purposes and reflects the author‟s judgment 
only; no official status or statement is implied. The author is liable for possible misallocations due to data deficiency.  
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1942  Globex  Moscow  VEB 
2403  GPB-Ipoteka  Moscow  Gazprombank 
1911  KIT Finance  St.Petersburg  Russian Railways 
2584  Kredit Ural Bank  Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk 
region 
Gazprombank 
1088  MAK-Bank  Moscow  Alrosa - 84.7% 
2003  MeTraKomBank  Rostov/Don   TransKreditBank - 76.4% 
2863  Mosvodokanalbank  Moscow  Bank Moskvy 50.1% 
3466  Nacionalny kliringoviy 
centr 
Moscow  MICEX 
2786  Novosibirskiy municipal-
ny 
Novosibirsk  Khanty-Mansiyskiy bank 
2274  Noyabrskneftekombank  Noyabrsk, Tyumen region  Gazprombank 
729  Petrovskiy  St.Petersburg  ASV - 50% 
2790  Roseximbank  Moscow  VEB 
3340  Rossiyskiy bank razvitiya  Moscow  VEB - 100% 
2312  Rossiyskiy kapital  Moscow  ASV - 100% 
1968  Russkiy ipotechniy bank  Moscow  Gazenergoprombank via Sobinbank 
2816  Severgazbank  Vologda  Gazprombank 
3042  Sibirgazbank  Surgut, Tyumen region  Gazprombank 
1317  Sobinbank  Moscow  Gazenergoprombank 
2307  Soyuz  Moscow  Gazprom via Gazfinans - 75% 
1338  Superbank  Blagoveschensk   TransKreditBank - 51.1% 
1470  Svyaz-Bank  Moscow  VEB 
459  Tarkhany  Penza  ASV 
3238  Transinvestbank  Moscow  Gazprom via Mosenergo 
2142  TransKreditBank  Moscow  Russian Railways - 55% 
1342  Vostokbiznesbank  Vladivostok   TransKreditBank - 99.9% 
3287  Vserossiysky bank razvi-
tiya regionov 
Moscow  Rosneft 
439  VTB Severo-Zapad  St.Petersburg  VTB 
1623  VTB-24  Moscow  VTB 
414  Yugo-Vostok  Voronezh   TransKreditBank - 78.5% 
 
  Banks governed by the state without a majority stake in equity 
2590  Ak Bars  Kazan  Tatarstan Republic 
3334  Bank Khakassii  Abakan  Khakassia regional administration 
1049  Khakassky muniucipalny  Abakan  Abakan municipality - 40% 
912  Moskovsky industrialny  Moscow  Moscow municipality 
948  Mosstroyekonombank  Moscow  Moscow municipality 
2103  Municipalny Kamchatpro-
fitbank 
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky  Kamchatka regional administration 
1309  Narodny bank Respubliki 
Tyva 
Kyzyl  Tyva Republic - 42.5% 
410  Nomos-bank-Sibir  Novosibirsk  ASV 





2484  Onego  Petrozavodsk  Karelia regional administration 
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  Other state-influenced banks   
2227  Bank24.ru  Yekaterinburg  ASV 
2189  Bashinvest  Ufa  ASV 
3388  Finservice  Moscow  Gazenergoprombank via Sobinbank - 49% 
3252  Gazenergobank  Kaluga  ASV 
2888  Kazansky  Kazan  KMPO (?), Kazan municipality (?) 
2179  KB Otkrytie  Moscow  ASV 
3087  Nacionalny torgovy  Togliatti, Samara region  VEB - 16.7% 
1902  Naratbank  Saratov  Ak Bars 
1851  Nizhegorodpromstroybank  Nizhny Novgorod  ASV 
926  Nizhny Novgorod  Nizhny Novgorod  ASV 
2546  Novikombank  Moscow  Rosoboronexport (?) 
2786  Novosibirsky municipalny  Novosibirsk  Novosibirsk municipality 
1019  Potentsial  Zhigulevsk, Samara region  ASV 
3262  Rinvestbank  Ryazan  Ryazan regional administration 
2083  Severnaya kazna  Yekaterinburg  ASV 
2975  Sverdlovsky gubernsky  Yekaterinburg  ASV 
2523  Uralsky trastoviy  Izhevsk  ASV via Bank Petrovsky 
Source: bank data 
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